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Abstract
Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral
difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's
infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who
lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die
are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in
showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing
the button will change who lives and dies. I argue that because killing and
letting die are morally equivalent we have no reason to press the button in the
machine case. Pressing the button in this case is morally wrong because there
is no reason to do it; to press the button is to treat matters of life and death
irreverently.
Introduction
In Helen Frowe's “Killing John to Save Mary: A Defense of the Moral
Distinction between Killing and Letting Die,” she argues that there is a
substantial moral difference between killing and letting die. She sets out to
demonstrate the difference by analyzing Michael Tooley's machine case:
1. Machine – Two children – John and Mary – have been placed
inside two chambers in a machine. Between the two chambers is a
canister of poison gas that will shortly be released into Mary’s
chamber. However, if a passerby presses a button on the machine, the
gas will be released into John’s chamber instead. 1

1

For the original version of this case, see Tooley (1980). For the purposes of each case discussed
in this paper assume the agents involved are infallible about the consequences of their actions
unless otherwise noted.
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Tooley infamously contends that because killing and letting die are morally
equivalent 2 , the passerby ought to flip a coin to decide whether to press the
button. Frowe argues that the passerby shouldn't press the button, nor should
he flip a coin to decide whether to press the button because (1) there is a
significant moral difference between killing and letting die (killing is worse)
and (2) pressing the button would be a case of redirecting harm from one
person to another – from Mary to John – and thus pressing the button is
worse than doing nothing. Frowe argues that it is only acceptable to
redistribute harm to others if they have what she calls "a "fair chance" to
avoid being at risk of harm." (59) Frowe constructs a series of cases that she
believes illustrates these two points.
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I look at Frowe's
argument that killing and letting die are inequivalent. I argue that Frowe fails
to show that there is a morally significant difference between killing and
letting die. In the second, I look at Frowe's theory of redirecting harm, and
argue that it is inconsistent with our commonsense moral intuitions regarding
self-defense. Despite this, I contend that Frowe has given us the tools to show
that pressing the button in the machine case is morally wrong regardless of
whether killing and letting die are equivalent. In the third section I argue that
if killing and letting die are morally equivalent, then the outcome of pressing
the button is morally equivalent to the outcome of not pressing the button. As
the outcomes are (by assumption) equivalent - either Mary dies or John dies the agent lacks any moral reason to intervene. To press the button, then, is at
least prima facie morally wrong because it is a waste of time and effort.
Furthermore, there is another reason why we shouldn't press the button - or
flip a coin - in this case - it treats matters of life and death irreverently.
I. On Killing and Letting Die
To illustrate the difference between killing and letting die, Frowe compares
the following two cases:
2. Disease – Both JohnD and MaryD have a fatal disease. Their doctor
has a single dose of the antidote. “Neither John nor Mary has any prior
claim upon the antidote.” (Frowe, 57)

2

To use James Rachels' terminology, all else being equal there are the same reasons against
killing as there are letting die, and thus killing and letting die are morally equivalent. See
Rachels (1975), (1979), (2001).
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3. Diseased Mary – MaryDM has a fatal, non-communicable disease.
She is trapped in a room with JohnDM (sedated) and the instructions
and materials necessary to make the cure – a gas poisonous to those
without the disease. She will die before help arrives to free either of
them from the room.
Frowe contends that in Disease, “one ought to toss a coin” to determine who
lives; but in Diseased Mary “one should not toss a coin to see whether Mary
can permissibly [kill] John.” (57) There are two problems with comparing
these cases to the machine case - (1) flipping the coin plays a different role in
Machine than it does in Disease, and (2) Diseased Mary differs from Disease
in that there is no impartial third party.
For Tooley, in Machine, the passerby finds himself caught in a Buridan's
ass-type situation. He believes that all life is precious, and after examining
the machine and trying to see if he can free both of the children, he concludes
that there are only two options - (a) press the button (kill John, save Mary) or
(b) not press the button (let Mary die, let John live). For Tooley, the coin flip
serves as an ad hoc subjectively-indeterministic tie-break to free the passerby
from his indecision. Tooley's passerby believes that both options are morally
equivalent, and yet he has to choose between the two (otherwise he'd be
stuck, unable to make a choice, like Buridan's Ass was said to be stuck
indefinitely between two equally appetizing options, unable to choose
between them).
In contrast, in Disease, for Frowe, flipping the coin is used as a fair and
impartial means to determine who gets the antidote. JohnD and MaryD are
equally deserving, but only one can get the antidote. Here the coin flip serves
as an ad hoc subjectively-indeterministic tie-breaker, but unlike in Tooley's
case, the coin flip is supposed to makes the outcome fair.
To illustrate this difference, suppose two passersby pass by Tooley's
machine. The first finds herself equally drawn to pressing the button and not
pressing it, and flips a coin to decide what she will do. Let's say she presses
the button, redirecting the harm from Mary to John. The second passerby also
flips a coin, then flips the switch redirecting the harm back from John to
Mary. If the coin flip is an indeterministic means of breaking her mental
stalemate, the first passerby might notice the second pressing the button undoing her work - but she would have no reason to be offended or to go
back and press the button again.
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In contrast, suppose two doctors enter the room in Disease. For Frowe,
the coin flip determines the just outcome. If a second doctor stopped the
administration of the antidote and flipped a second coin, then gave it to the
winner of the second coin flip rather than the first, this would be considered
unfair and the first doctor would have a moral reason to intervene.
The second problem with Frowe's analysis turns on the fact that Diseased
Mary is unlike the previous two cases in that there is no impartial third party.
Coin-flips in both Machine and Disease were used by impartial third parties
to guide their actions. Here Mary is not an impartial third party. The relevant
question here is whether Mary is morally justified to kill in self-defense.
Commonsense ethics, and many normative ethical theories, seem to hold that
it is morally acceptable for innocent persons to kill other innocent persons in
self-defense. Although such cases are rare, it is generally accepted that when
all else is equal, we can put our own well-being ahead of that of others. Mary
is justified in creating the cure that will incidentally kill John in Diseased
Mary because she is acting in self-defense. For Frowe’s purposes, though, we
need a revised case:
3a. Diseased Mary in the Machine – JohnDMM and MaryDMM – have
been placed inside two chambers in a machine separated by a thin
plastic wall. MaryDMM has a fatal, non-communicable disease. In
JohnDMM’s chamber are all of the instructions and materials for
making the cure – a gas fatal to those without the disease. By pressing
a button on the machine, a passerby can dissolve the plastic wall
between the two chambers.
Unlike Diseased Mary, this case is not a case of self-defense.
Frowe says “One way that we can explain the difference between Disease
and Diseased Mary is by thinking about the courses of action that we could
justify to John.” (57) There are two substantive flaws with this stance. First,
if we're interested in justifying our potential actions, we should be equally
interested in justifying them to Mary as we are in justifying them to John.
Second, there is a substantive difference between justifying an act and
justifying an act to John; the latter seems to imply that we need John's
permission to morally engage in the act - in this case putting John in danger but I suspect many wouldn't be inclined to consent to being put in danger,
even if doing so was morally acceptable. For example, most people believe
that killing in self-defense is morally acceptable - especially killing vicious
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agents who freely put your life at risk. Suppose a vicious murderer kidnaps
you and locks you in a cage deep in his basement and that, while readying his
weapons, he explains that he is going to kill you. It occurs to you, however,
that you might be able to save yourself if you kill him first. It would be quite
absurd to suggest that you would need to be able to (counterfactually) justify
your act of self-defense to the killer in order to kill in self-defense.
Most moral philosophers would have no trouble justifying the right to kill
in self-defense, but it is a radically different question whether or not such a
justification would be sufficient to justify it to the killer. Whether we can
justify our action to the killer is irrelevant to whether or not we can kill the
killer in self-defense.
In Disease, Frowe contends both John and Mary would consent to a coin
flip deciding their fate; but that “In Diseased Mary John has no reason to
agree to a third party’s tossing a coin to decide whether Mary can
manufacture the gas.” (58) It's not clear that a third party has any bearing
over Mary's actions in Diseased Mary, so for our purposes Frowe would
contend that in Diseased Mary in the Machine John would have no reason to
agree to the passerby's tossing a coin to decide whether to press the button.
Still, this line of reasoning raises three problems.
First, it's not clear that Mary and John wouldn't advocate for some other
ad hoc arbitrary decision making convention, such as "first-come, first
served," the outcome of a game of checkers, etc. If we stipulate Mary and
John are rational, self-interested individuals, then there's no reason to think
they'd consent to a truly impartial decision making method at all - they'd
prefer the method that would give them the best chance to live. This
illustrates an important unparallel between Frowe's analysis of Disease and
Diseased Mary - Mary's interests aren't consulted in the latter, and thus
Frowe puts Mary at a disadvantage.
This unparallel is the second problem with Frowe's analysis. Here, Frowe
seems to be begging the question - assuming that there is a morally relevant
difference between killing and letting die, such that our actions need to be
justified to John more so than Mary, because we'd be killing John, but merely
letting Mary die. However, killing and letting die each affect the dying
equally, so if we're interested in justifying our actions, we should be
interested in what justification the passerby in Diseased Mary in the Machine
could give to both parties to justify treating them unequally, to justify letting
the person who put them in the machine decide their fate, or to justify letting
luck (the flipping of a coin) decide who lives and who dies. Frowe contends
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pressing the button cannot be justified to John, but certainly his inaction
would be comparably uncomforting for Mary!
Third, Frowe's reliance on justification here seems inherently misguided in some cases, John might agree to be killed to save Mary's life. Perhaps John
is altruistic, perhaps he's suicidal. If John's consent matters here, this is
morally relevant, such that Frowe should at least consider that in some cases
killing might be preferable to letting die - when one has the consent of both
parties.
II. On Redirecting Harm
Killing is wrong in Machine, Frowe contends, because it is redirecting harm
to John “and John is not part of the lethal sequence of events that threatens
Mary’s life.” (58) Frowe contends that it is not always wrong to redirect
harms; she says doing so would be acceptable in cases like the following:
4. Body Armor – Aggressor shoots at Victim. Bystander is nearby and
can protect herself by putting on body armor, but refuses “because
protective clothing is unflattering.” (58-59) Victim can save himself
only by deflecting a bullet towards Bystander. 3
The relevant difference between Body Armor and Machine, she contends, is
that Bystander had a prior chance to avoid even the risk of harm. Frowe
contends “If the bystander had no chance to avoid her position… it is
impermissible to kill [her] in… self-defense.” (59) This suggests that if the
bystander had a chance to avoid putting herself in harm's way and failed to do
so (whether intentionally or negligently), then it may be acceptable to kill her
in self-defense.
By the same token, if there is no morally relevant difference between
killing and letting die, then in Diseased Mary, MaryDM may be justified in
acting to save her own life in such a way that will unintentionally kill JohnDM
if JohnDM had previously had a chance to avoid being trapped in the room.
Notably Frowe does not specify whether JohnDM could have avoided being
locked in the room with MaryDM.
I agree that Victim would have different moral obligations towards a
negligent Bystander than towards a virtuous Bystander; however her account
in Body Armor is still radically inconsistent with our commonsense intuitions
regarding killing in self-defense. Consider:
3

For the purposes of this and the following case, bullets are always lethal.
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4a. No Body Armor – AggressorA shoots at VictimA with his last
bullet. BystanderA is nearby – wrong place, wrong time. VictimA can
save himself only by deflecting a bullet towards BystanderA.
While tragic, my intuition is that VictimA is morally justified in acting in selfdefense, even at the possible cost of an innocent person’s life. (Of course
VictimA might, like John, justifiable choose to put the life of others ahead of
his own, but this isn't required.) Self-defense cases are generally problematic
because even those committed to the view that everyone’s life is morally
equivalent tend to have strong intuitions in favor of putting one's own life
ahead of others in self-defense cases. One explanation is that (innocent)
persons have a right to self-defense. Insofar as rights go, this one seems
straightforward enough. Assuming moral agents have a right to life, in cases
of scarcity and conflict there is a prima facie moral obligation to act to
prevent conflict; but when there is no other course, killing in self-defense is
prima facie morally acceptable.
However, because I am generally leery of rights-talk, an alternate
explanation for why we are morally justified in choosing to preserve
ourselves over others turns on our privileged access to our private mental
states and moral history. For the moment, let's assume VictimA is a generally
good person. If this is the case, all else being equal, VictimA has more reason
to believe he is innocent than a stranger, and because he is morally obligated
to favor innocent persons over villainous ones, he is obligated to favor
himself over BystanderA. This does not mean that VictimA doesn’t have any
moral obligations to BystanderA. If VictimA has the option to either deflect
the bullet and certainly kill BystanderA or deflect it in such a way it would kill
no one, all else being equal he is morally obligated to do the latter. Frowe
contends that this kind of obligation would be lesser for “willing bystanders”
in the same position as the one in Body Armor – but it would be quite odd if
Frowe thinks that the killing would only be justified in terms of the relatively
minor moral failing of being negligent. It's certainly not something that you
can reliably justify to the negligent bystander, who - much like John - would
probably vote against any action that would result in his death.
I think the privileged access account above is superior to the rights-based
account because it explains our intuitions in rare cases where self-defense
comes at a steep price. Consider the following case:

99

William Simkulet

4b. Impending Nuclear Armageddon – Terrorists have hacked into a
nuclear armed submarine, and have aimed the missiles at a large
number of highly populated targets. The only way to stop these
missiles from launching is to activate the convenient new "selfdestruct" system that responds to the captain's voice. As the captain
begins uttering the self-destruct code, Ricky (a reporter covering the
submarine) decides that he doesn't want to die and realizes that he can
use his microphone cord to strangle the captain, preventing him to
blowing up the ship, saving his life at the cost of millions of others.
According to the rights-based theory, it is morally acceptable (but not
obligatory) for Ricky to kill the captain. However, according to the privileged
access theory, because Ricky has overwhelming evidence that killing the
captain will result in the deaths of many innocent persons, it is unacceptable
to do so. Though, this is not to say that it is morally unacceptable to risk the
lives of immoral persons to save yourself; consider this variation of Body
Armor
4c. Willing Spectators – Sparky has been enslaved and forced to fight
in the Coliseum in front of legions of fight fans fully aware and
apparently indifferent to the fact that he has been enslaved. One day, a
lion lunges at Sparky, who has to choose whether to let the lion maw
him, or to deflect the lion into the stands where he will no doubt kill
many spectators.
Just as Frowe thinks it is justifiable to deflect a bullet in Body Armor, I think
it is acceptable to deflect the lion in Willing Spectators. Even if the immoral
actions of the spectators are not worthy of death, I think their immoral action
absolves Sparky – and us – from having to worry about their well-being in
such a case. They might not have deserved to be killed, but they did fail,
morally. In contrast, in Diseased Mary, even if it is morally acceptable for
Mary to kill John to save her own life, she shouldn't be happy about it.
I have the strong intuition it is acceptable to kill in No Body Armor, but
Frowe argues it is wrong to deflect harm onto innocents. Still, I suspect she
would conclude it is morally acceptable to kill innocents who are the sources
of possible harm to you, for example virtuous soldiers on opposing sides
during war. It strikes me as odd that it would be acceptable to kill innocent
persons trying to fulfill their moral obligations, but not innocent persons in
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the wrong place at the wrong time. However, Frowe contends that it is
acceptable to deflect the bullet in Body Armor solely because of Bystander’s
moral failing, and contends it is never morally acceptable to kill “bystanders”
(those who have not initiated a threat) in self-defense. Believing this, she
turns to her penultimate case:
5. Armed Machine – JohnAM and MaryAM – have been placed inside
two chambers in a machine. MaryAM will be killed unless a passerby
presses the button. If the button is pressed, JohnAM will be killed in
her stead. Their kidnapper has armed JohnAM and MaryAM with
modified automatic-weapons fixed to the outside of the machine. The
trustworthy kidnapper tells them that one of the weapons is loaded
with live ammunition, and one is loaded with blanks, and that the
weapons can only fire on a warm heat signature of a human being.
Frowe contends that JohnAM would be morally justified in firing on the
passerby if he tried to press the button because his trying to press the button
would be a threat. Although killing the passerby would get MaryAM nothing,
Frowe asks whether MaryAM might be justified in shooting him in the knee
and promising further force if he doesn’t press the button. If MaryAM’s action
is justified, Frowe says, “we are committed to the implausible claim that one
may use seriously harmful means to force a person to come to one’s aid at the
cost of an innocent person’s [JohnAM’s] life.” (61) While regrettable, I don’t
find this implausible. Indeed, this is what I contend is acceptable in No Body
Armor; that one is morally justified in acting in self-defense even at the cost
of the life of an innocent person.
If MaryAM is not justified in using this force, Frowe contends, it supports
the view that there is a substantial difference between killing and letting die.
(61) She goes on to say “… that you may not do as much against someone
who refuses to save you as you may do against someone who is going to kill
you is sufficient to support the killing/letting die distinction.” This is just
bizarre; consider a variation of Armed Machine:
5a. Solo Machine – MarySM has been placed inside a machine that will
release poison gas into her chamber when the clock hits zero unless
someone presses a button. This is all very obvious to Mary and
anyone who would pass her by. Her captors have given Mary a
machine gun.
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Suppose a numbers of passersby see MarySM's plight, see that it is easy for
them to save her life, and freely choose not to do so. Certainly MarySM is
morally justified in both threatening to kill bystanders who would let her die,
as well as following through with her threat if they fail to save her life especially if doing so might make other bystanders press the button. The very
notion that a passerby might witness MarySM's plight and do nothing is
morally abhorrent!
In Solo Machine, it seems that we can do as much against someone who
refuses to save you as you may do against someone who is going to kill you that is to say that there is no support for the killing/letting die distinction.
The difference between Solo Machine and Armed Machine is that the
passersby who freely let Mary die when saving her life would cost them next
to nothing are uncontroversially moral monsters, while the passerby in Armed
Machine certainly does not exhibit the same disregard for human life. If Mary
is unjustified in acting in Armed Machine, surely it is because the character of
her targets is different - they're not clear moral monsters for not killing an
innocent person to save her life, where as in Solo Machine they would be
clear moral monsters for letting her die for no reason.
III. Killing Arbitrarily
Frowe’s final case, I think, has the most merit:
6. Blind Machine – A passerby comes across a machine in which two
children have been placed inside separate chambers. A canister of gas
is hidden out of view above one of the chambers. Pressing the button
will change the chamber it is aimed at.
There is no good reason to press the button here, as the passerby cannot tell
who he will be killing and saving. Blind Machine illustrates the futility of
flipping a coin in Machine. Because John and Mary are morally equivalent in
Machine, there is nothing that the passerby can do that could bring about a
morally different outcome. To press the button is to waste the passerby’s
effort, and perhaps to cause additional psychological harm to those trapped in
the machine.
Blind Machine doesn’t let Frowe help herself to the conclusion that
killing is worse than letting die; pressing the button in Blind Machine is
wrong because there is no reason to do so, and thus to press the button is to
act irrationally and wastefully. Furthermore, pressing the button might cause
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additional harm and suffering to those in the machine. Tooley’s position isn’t
that killing and letting die are always morally equivalent, but that all else
being equal, killing and letting die are morally equivalent. All Blind Machine
has demonstrated is that Machine doesn’t quite make everything else
equivalent.
Suppose, though, that the passerby presses the button in Blind Machine.
And suppose that she does it often because she likes having control over who
lives and dies. This, it strikes me, is morally abhorrent because the passerby
is making life or death decisions without regard to morality; her actions aren't
done for moral reasons, rather they're done in wanton defiance of morality.
This is a particularly egregious form of willful negligence, what we might
call "playing God" because it involves carelessness with matters great
importance - of life and death. I think it is uncontroversially true that this
passerby acts immorally, and is severely morally blameworthy for her
actions. Note that the actual or expected consequences of her actions are
irrelevant to explaining what's wrong with her choice. Suppose that she
presses the button twice - the gas momentarily switches targets, but then
switches back. This has no effect on the outcome, but the passerby is clearly
morally blameworthy for her careless attitude towards the life and death of
others.
Conclusion
We are now in a better position to explain what is wrong with pushing the
button in Tooley's machine case. If moral agents have (libertarian) free will,
then they're not like Buridan's ass - they can make (arbitrary) choices
between two outcomes on their own without flipping a coin. (The doctors in
Disease, while capable of making arbitrary choices, probably should use an
impartial, observable decision making method to demonstrate that their
decision was arbitrary.) We can sensibly say that the passerby has at least
three options - press the button, don't press the button, or flip a coin to decide
whether to press the button. If killing and letting die are morally equivalent,
all three options have a morally equivalent outcome and we can't decide
between them by consequences alone. Because pressing the button and
flipping the coin involve some effort, the default circumstance - not pressing
the button is preferable. To decide for any other reason is to make a decision
based on irrelevant grounds and to treat matters of life and death as if they
didn't matter - and this is morally abhorrent.
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